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THE GIFT OF OPPORTUNITY
Randall J. Gingiss*
INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the federal transfer tax treatment of gifts of services
as well as other opportunities in order to see how such activities fit, or at least
ought to fit, within our transfer tax system. The Article will examine how gifts
of opportunity and services compare to gifts of interests in closely held busi-
nesses and will suggest that, instead of trying to tax gifts of opportunity, the
Internal Revenue Code ("Code") should be amended to exempt closely held
businesses from the transfer tax system. The existence of closely held busi-
nesses is something to be encouraged. Transfer taxation hinders the passing of
closely held businesses because it places a heavy burden on the next genera-
tion. Although closely held businesses can be taxed in an enforceable manner,
they are inherently difficult to value. Gifts of services and opportunity accom-
plish the same result as gifts of interests in corporations and partnerships but,
unlike the latter, are incapable of enforceable taxation. If closely held busi-
nesses must be taxed, there is an easier and more enforceable way to tax them
that avoids the valuation problems inherent in the current system.
The starting point of the discussion is a classic 1977 article by Professor
George Cooper.1 In his article, Professor Cooper discusses various methods by
which careful planning could avoid the federal estate tax on the estates of
wealthy individuals. Some of his concerns about widely used methods of trans-
fer tax avoidance have been remedied-by legislation such as the federal gener-
ation-skipping transfer tax.2 Others have been remedied by court decisions.8
* B.A., cum laude, 1966, Amherst College; J.D., 1969, University of Michigan; L.L.M in Tax-
ation, 1980, DePaul University; M.B.A., 1991, University of Chicago. Partner, Levenfeld, Eisen-
berg, Janger, Glassberg, Samotny & Halper, Chicago, Illinois; Chairman, American Bar Associa-
tion Post Mortem Tax Planning Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law; Past Chair,
Estate Gift Tax Section of the Chicago Bar Association; Adjunct Faculty, DePaul University
College of Law and Loyola University of Chicago School of Law.
The author wishes to thank three of his colleagues and friends for their helpful comments on
this Article: James Colliton, Professor of Law, DePaul University; David Sinow, Professor of Fi-
nance, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; and Donald Zeigler, Professor of Law, New
York Law School.
1. George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspective on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoid-
ance, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 161 (1977).
2. I.R.C. § 2601 (West Supp. 1991). Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to the Internal
Revenue Code are to this version.
3. Most notably among these decisions is Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330 (1984) (dis-
cussed infra notes 19-26 and accompanying text).
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Some still remain.' In particular, Professor Cooper looked at several tax avoid-
ance techniques, such as the gift of services, as loopholes in the gift tax sys-
tem. He concluded that changes must be made in the transfer tax system to
close these loopholes. I am suggesting that some of those loopholes are incapa-
ble of being closed, and exempting closely held businesses not only will be
fairer but also will accomplish desirable social goals.
Part I of this Article examines the case law and statutory authority on the
issue of taxing gifts of services and opportunity. Although there is little statu-
tory authority directly bearing on the issue, there has been a sporadic history
of cases that test the outer limits of the gift tax statutes.
Part II deals with the problems of valuation. Valuation of closely held busi-
nesses is one of the most difficult issues in the current tax system. Any sug-
gested alternatives to the current federal gift tax and federal estate tax should
address the difficulty of placing a reasonable fair market value on interests in
closely held businesses.
Part III discusses the alternatives that have been suggested to date as well
as their impact on gifts of opportunity and gifts of interests in closely held
businesses. There are a number of suggested alternatives to the current trans-
fer tax scheme, including a wealth tax,5 an accessions tax,6 a consumption
tax,7 a restructuring of the current system to make gifts difficult to complete,8
or simply a repeal of the transfer taxes accompanied by repeal of Code section
102,9 thereby subjecting gifts and inheritances to income tax." These alterna-
tives will be reviewed here only in the context of gifts of opportunity or of
services compared to inheritances of incorporated family businesses or family
partnerships.
Part IV of this Article articulates new alternatives that exclude taxation of
closely held businesses. If, however, some sort of tax on closely held businesses
is inevitable, the tax should be based on modified income, which will render
valuation at death or at the time of a gift unnecessary.
The threshold issue is what can or should be done about the inability to tax
gifts of opportunity or services under the current gift tax. Professor Cooper's
suggestion is a wealth tax.11 His thesis is that an annual wealth tax would
4. See infra notes 47-60 and accompanying text (discussing family partnerships); infra notes
69-71 and accompanying text (business referrals, such as in Crowley v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.
333 (1960)); infra notes 72-83 and accompanying text (bringing one's children into a
partnership).
5. See Infra notes 146-51 and accompanying text (discussing current wealth tax proposals).
6. See Infra notes 152-55 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of an accessions
tax).
7. See infra notes 156-57 (examining a consumption tax proposal).
8. Prof. Joseph M. Dodge makes a compelling case for a "difficult to complete" theory of gift
taxation. See Joseph M. Dodge, Redoing the Estate and Gift Taxes Along Easy-to-Value Lines,
43 TAx L. REv. 241, 255-60 (1988).
9. See id. at 245.
10. See Infra notes 147-48 and accompanying text (discussing a proposal to create a compre-
hensive tax base).
11. See Cooper, supra note 1, at 231-35. The wealth tax concept has frequently raised constitu-
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make it unimportant which family member has the wealth, so that a gift of
opportunity would be no different than a gift of shares of, say, General Mo-
tors. Both a wealth tax and Professor Cooper's discussion of it have received
considerable discussion."2 My suggestions and conclusion are far different than
the alternatives suggested in the current literature.
The proposal that closely held businesses should not be the subject of trans-
fer taxation, as with most proposals, has definitional problems and requires
scrutiny to ensure that it will not encourage questionable behavior without
social function other than tax avoidance. These problems are inherent in most
taxing schemes, including the current federal estate and gift taxes. I make
certain assumptions:
- The current gift tax cannot and should not attempt to tax most of the
cases discussed above. There are simply too many practical problems that
are too difficult to address.1"
" It is offensive to attempt to tax dining room discussions.
" The problems of valuing services and opportunity are insurmountable.
The problems in valuing closely held businesses are not much easier and
the Internal Revenue Service ("Service") has lost a great many valuation
cases. 
14
- It is impossible to trace the source of investment advice that results in a
particular investment, except in some obvious cases involving investments
on behalf of minor children.
* Closely held businesses generally do not run themselves, but require as
much effort from the younger generation as from the older simply to hold
their own.
* There is a greater bias against inherited wealth than against wealth
built through one's own efforts. Closely held businesses require the contin-
uing efforts of owners.
* There is pressure on closely held businesses with many collateral owners
(cousins several generations down from the founder) to pay dividends,
which is a doubly taxed form of distribution that in turn creates some
tional issues based on Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637.(1895), which
held that taxes on real property, personal property, income from real property, and income from
personal property were "direct taxes" that had to be apportioned among the states in accordance
with population. Id. The 16th Amendment to the United States Constitution overruled Pollock
insofar as an income tax was concerned, but left in place Pollock's holding that a tax on wealth
was unconstitutional. The United States Supreme Court overruled Pollock on the issue of exemp-
tion of state bonds from federal registration requirements in South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S.
505, 526-27 (1988). Whether this case overruled Pollock for all purposes is not clear from the
decision.
12. See, e.g., Gilbert P. Verbit, Taxing Wealth: Recent Proposals from the United States,
France and the United Kingdom, 60 B.U. L. REV. 1, 1-5 (1980) (discussing the renewed attention
being focused on a periodic wealth tax).
13. CHARLES LoWNDES ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXES 664 (3d ed. 1974).
14. See Cooper, supra note 1, at 195-204 (noting Internal Revenue Service losses in valuation
controversies).
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pressure to buy out the collaterals or go public.16 There are adequate
safeguards in the income tax system against massive payroll padding for
relatives.
A common theme of alternative proposals is that all forms of inherited
wealth must be taxed at the time of transfer. This may be understandable
from the point of view of an inheritance of a residence or valuable jewelry, but
I suggest taxation at time of transfer is an unnecessary requirement for taxing
a closely held business.
What gives property value? In the case of jewelry or art, it is the combina-
tion of inherent beauty and scarcity. With regard to a residence, there is a
nonmonetary benefit in the form of in-kind use.16 In the case of bank accounts
and publicly listed securities, there is a storage of purchasing potential as well
as the potential to earn income. With closely held businesses, it is income-
earning potential. If one insists on taxing closely held businesses, and if one is
willing to wait until that income becomes possessory, there is a very simple
means to tax it. It is called an income tax. For the very wealthy, one need only
make the income tax more progressive for income from a successful business.
Perhaps a claim of an exemption from transfer taxation would be the point at
which an income tax surcharge would be imposed. The disadvantage here,
however, would still be a difference between the treatment of business trans-
fers and transfers of services or other opportunities. The inability to make the
distinction on a taxable basis argues in favor of a tax-free treatment for both
transfers of services and opportunity on the one hand, and closely held busi-
nesses17 on the other.
I. EXISTING CASES AND STATUTES
There is currently no direct mention of the gift of opportunity in the trans-
15. See, e.g., Neff v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 669 (1989) (discussed infra notes 127-
31 and accompanying text).
16. It may be argued that there is a monetary equivalent in avoided rent. The United Kingdom
attempted to tax such rental value in income without success. See Income Tax Act of 1952, 15 &
16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, ch. 10, §§ 106-215, repealed by Finance Act of 1963, § 14 (Eng.).
17. I have not attempted to define "closely held business" for purposes of this Article. Section
6166 of the Internal Revenue Code, which allows a deferral of taxes for closely held businesses,
has a definition that covers corporations and partnerships:
For purposes of this section, the term "interest in a closely held business" means-
(A) an interest as a proprietor in a trade or business carried on as a proprietorship;
(B) an interest as a partner in a partnership carrying on a trade or business, if-
(i) 20 percent or more of the total capital interest in such partnership is included in
determining the gross estate of the decedent, or
(ii) such partnership had 15 or fewer partners; or
(C) stock in a corporation carrying on a trade or business, if-
(i) 20 percent or more in value of the voting stock of such corporation is included in
determining the gross estate of the decedent, or
(ii) such corporation had 15 or fewer shareholders.
I.R.C. § 6166.
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fer tax statutes.18 The Service has, from time to time and with varying success,
attempted to bring such gifts within the orbit of the gift tax.
A. Dickman v. Commissioner-The Most Recent Landmark
In Dickman v. Commissioner,"9 the United States Supreme Court estab-
lished that the gratuitous giving of the use of property constitutes a taxable
gift, thereby putting an end to the use of interest-free demand loans as a de-
vice to pass wealth to family members outside of the federal transfer tax sys-
tem.20 Some of the language in the case is quite broad: "Congress intended the
gift tax statute to reach all gratuitous transfers of any valuable interest in
property .... [T]he gift tax was designed to encompass all transfers of prop-
erty and property rights having significant value."'21 Such language indicates
that there is confusion surrounding the term "property." The question remains
whether the Service can go beyond the term "property" and cover gifts of
opportunity, such as education, business investments, business contacts, and
services.
Any such examination is aided by a review of the goals that the federal
transfer tax system was intended to accomplish. While the early versions of
the federal estate tax were intended to raise revenue, it appears that the cur-
rent purpose, to the degree that it has been enunciated at all, is to inhibit the
passing of inherited wealth from generation to generation.2 2 The federal gift
tax was enacted as a backup to the estate tax to prevent taxpayers from avoid-
ing the estate tax by making lifetime gifts.2 Gifts of services, including spot-
ting business opportunities and business contacts, cannot be passed by will.
Using the federal gift tax to tax these items does not serve any backup pur-
pose, yet independently taxes valuable transfers.2' Nevertheless, such gifts do
accomplish an increase in the wealth of junior generations. It is well estab-
18. Id. For purposes of this Article, the "transfer tax statutes" are the federal estate tax
(Chapter 11 of the Code, I.R.C. §§ 2001-2210), the federal gift tax (Chapter 12 of the Code,
I.R.C. §§ 2501-2524), the federal generation-skipping transfer tax (Chapter 13 of the Code,
I.R.C. §§ 2601-2663) and Special Valuation rules (Chapter 14 of the Code, I.R.C. §§ 2701-
2704). The last is not a separate tax but a set of rules that apply to the others.
19. 465 U.S. 330 (1984).
20. Id. at 343.
21. Id. at 334.
22. See Gerald R. Jatscher, The Aims of Death Taxation, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY
PROPERTY: ESSAYS AND AMERICAN ASSEMBLY REPORT 40, 41-55 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed.,
1977) (discussing the policy of the federal transfer tax system to inhibit passing wealth from
generation to generation); see also Hearing before the Subcomm. on Estate and Gift Taxation of
the Senate Comm. on Finance, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1981) [hereinafter 1981 Estate & Gift
Tax Hearings] (statement of Gerald P. Moran); Cooper, supra note 1, at 244 (acknowledging the
policy goals of the transfer tax system). For an outstanding review of the history of the estate and
gift taxes involving contemporaneous statements of purpose, see Anne-Marie Rhodes, Individual,
Couple or Family? The Unit of Taxation for Transfer Tax Purposes: A Shifting Focus, 17 AK-
RON L. REV. 575 (1984).
23. Rhodes, supra note 22, at 581-82.
24. LOWNDES ET AL., supra note 13, at 664.
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lished, for example, that the children of wealthy families who have not yet
inherited any property are nevertheless wealthier than the children of less
wealthy families. 0 This has sometimes been explained as a transfer of human
capital, as distinguished from property.
B. Limited Statutory Coverage
The concept of gifts of opportunity has had limited coverage in the transfer
tax statutes. The gift tax statute expressly excludes gifts of educational ex-
penses from its coverage . 7 When one considers that less than 1 % of all fami-
lies have to worry about transfer taxes to begin with, 8 the educational expense
exemption is very curious from a policy perspective. If this exemption is to be
justified at all, it must be justified on the basis that to tax these expenditures
would be offensive to an overwhelming percentage of the population. Although
only a small percentage will have to pay the taxes,2 9 a much larger percentage
will have return filing requirements that will simply be ignored.30 This would
not be the first time that massive noncompliance has justified a relaxation of
the gift tax laws.31
25. See Jatscher, supra note 22, at 52.
26. See Michael J. Boskin, An Economist's Perspective on Estate Taxation, in DEATH, TAXES
AND FAMILY PROPERTY: ESSAYS AND AMERICAN ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 22, at 56, 58. For
an interesting, readable, and controversial book that discusses the role of human capital, see gen-
erally THOMAS SOWELL, THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RACE, AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPEC-
TIVE (1983). Sowell argues that much of the transfer of human capital comes from certain cul-
tural groups such as Jews, Chinese, Japanese, and West Indian blacks who, upon emigration, have
risen out of poverty in a generation. Without passing judgment on the validity of his analysis, it
raises some interesting gift-tax questions if the gift of opportunity is taxed. Many poverty-stricken,
first-generation Jews, Chinese, Japanese, and West Indian blacks (and many other groups as well)
would owe a gift tax they could not possibly afford to pay.
27. I.R.C. § 2503(e).
28. 1981 Estate & Gift Tax Hearings, supra note 22, at 114 (statement of Gerald P. Moran).
29. Even with today's college expenses, it will take some time before cumulative costs for all
children exceed the annual exclusion for each child ($10,000 for each donee from each donor,
$20,000 per donee for each married couple) and the exemption equivalent from the gift tax($600,000 for each individual, $1.2 million for a married couple). I.R.C. §§ 2503(b), 2513, 2505.
30. 1981 Estate and Gift Tax Hearings, supra note 22, at 176 (joint statement of Harvie
Branscomb, Jr., Chairman, and John S. Nolan, Chairman-Elect, Section of Taxation, American
Bar Association).
.31. Section 2515 of the federal gift tax was enacted with the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. It
provided that creation of tenancy by the entirety in real property between spouses was not a
taxable gift unless spouses elected it to be so, thereby statutorily overruling cases such as Lilly v.
Smith, 96 F.2d 341 (7th Cir.) (holding that the creation of a tenancy by the entirety between
spouses constitutes a taxable gift), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 604 (1938). In explaining the enactment,
the House Ways and Means Committee stated:
Under present law the creation of a tenancy by the entirety may result in a gift from
one spouse to the other at the time the tenancy is created. Moreover, the termination
of the tenancy may also constitute a gift unless the proceeds are divided between the
husband and wife. Frequently, real property is held in a tenancy by the entirety to
ensure the right of survivorship in the surviving spouse. Many couples who elect this
method of buying a home have no intention of making a gift at the time of the crea-
[Vol. 41:395
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The second area where the concept of opportunity appeared in the gift tax
statute is more obscure (and no longer existent). It occurred in the context of
the now-repealed Code section 2036(c).83 Section 2036(c) was designed to stop
the use of preferred stock asset freezes. With a preferred stock asset freeze, a
parent and majority shareholder recapitalizes a corporation into preferred and
common shares with characteristics such that the preferred shares would be
worth the current value of the corporation, but would be frozen in value. All
appreciation in the value of company shares would belong to the common
shares. The parent would then give the common shares to children, taking the
position that the common had little, if any, value.
Section 2036(c) was enacted in Section 10402(a) of the Revenue Act of
1987.11 As enacted, the statute was both complex and ambiguous. It stated
that if an individual held a substantial interest in an "enterprise," and such
individual transferred a disproportionate amount of appreciation while retain-
ing rights to income or voting rights, the transferor would be deemed to have
retained an interest in the transferred interest so that the transferred interest
would be included in the transferor's estate. The Technical and Miscellaneous
Revenue Act of 1988 ("TAMRA") ' attempted to correct some of the
ambiguities.
A major ambiguity in section 2036(c) was what constituted a retained inter-
est in income. Although the statute was aimed at a preferred share interest, it
could, as worded, apply to a loan from, or employment contract retained by,
the senior generation. It was also unclear whether a new enterprise, formed by
investments made by the senior and junior generations at the same time, was
covered by the statute. TAMRA defined two kinds of loans that were not re-
tained interests in an enterprise and therefore were exempt from the reach of
the new statute: qualified debt and qualified start-up debt."5 If the lender met
the requirements of either of these categories, he would not be deemed to have
retained an income interest in the enterprise. It is in the latter category, quali-
fied start-up debt, that the concept of business opportunity gets its only ex-
plicit mention in the transfer tax statutes:
Qualified Start-up Debt is defined as any indebtedness if:
(I) such indebtedness unconditionally requires the payment of a sum certain
in money,
(II) such indebtedness was received in exchange for cash to be used in any
enterprise involving the active conduct of a trade or business,
(III) the person to whom such indebtedness is owed has not at any time
tion of the tenancy by the entirety or any knowledge that they are considered as
having done so.
H.R. REP. No. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A323, reprinted in part in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4120-21.
32. I.R.C. § 2036(c) (West 1989) (repealed 1990).
33. Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330 (1987) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
26 U.S.C.).
34. Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
26 U.S.C.).
35. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7)(C) & (D) (West 1989) (repealed 1990).
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(whether before, on, or after the exchange referred to in subclause (II))
transferred any property (including goodwill) which was not cash to the en-
terprise or transferred customers or other business opportunities to the
enterprise,
(IV) the person to whom such indebtedness is owed has not at any time
(whether before, on, or after the exchange referred to in subclause (II)) held
any interest in the enterprise (including an interest as an officer, director, or
employee) which was not qualified startup debt,
(V) the person who (but for subparagraph (A)(i)) would have been an origi-
nal transferee (as defined in paragraph (4)(C)) participates in the active
management (as defined in section 2032A(e)(12)) of the enterprise, and
(VI) such indebtedness meets the requirements of clauses (v) and (vi) of
subparagraph (C)."
The details of section 2036(c) are unimportant for purposes of this discussion.
Of importance, however, is that the Code attempted to attach transfer tax
significance to certain nonproperty items: transfer of goodwill; transfer of cus-
tomers; transfer of business opportunities; and holding an interest as officer,
director, or employee.
The Service in recent years has not attempted to pursue gifts of services. 7
The closest the Service came to taxing these gifts was under the 1939 Code in
the companion cases of Hogle v. Commissioner (Hogle I)," and Commis-
sioner v. Hogle (Hogle II). 9 Hogle I, an income tax case, and Hogle II, a gift
tax case, arose out of the same transaction. The cases were not only decided
by the same court, but by the precisely same panel of judges.
The facts relevant to both Hogle I and Hogle II are simply stated. Mr.
Hogle established a trust for the benefit of his three children. The trust was
clearly irrevocable. Profits from trading on margin belonged to the trust, but
losses were to be made up by Mr. Hogle and his wife. Any losses, however,
were ultimately repaid by profits of the trust. Sales on margin were made by
the trust at Mr. Hogle's direction. In Hogle , the Tenth Circuit described Mr.
Hogle's activity as follows:
The income thus created and the profits thus realized were not merely in-
come accruing from the corpus of the trust or from capital gains realized
from disposition of corpus, but were profits earned through trading on mar-
gins involving the exercise of personal skill and judgment of Hogle and were
in substance the personal earnings of Hogle. The amount of trading on mar-
gins which Hogle was to carry on for the trust was wholly in his discretion.
He could trade little or much or not at all for the benefit of the trust as he
saw fit. Thus, he exercised practical control over what portion of income
36. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7)(D) (West 1989) (repealed 1990).
37. W. LESLIE PEAT & STEPHANIE J. WILLBANKS, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr TAXATION: AN
ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE 50-53 (1991); RICHARD B. STEVENS ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXATION I 10.01[2][g] (1991); FREDERICK I. GERHART, THE GIFr TAX 88 (1980).
38. 132 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1942) (Hogle 1).
39. 165 F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1947) (Hogle 11).
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from his personal efforts in trading on margins should accrue to the trust.40
The Hogle I opinion does not go so far as to say that Mr. Hogle allocated
profit from trades after the fact. Therefore, one assumes that all trades for the
trust were identified before the profit or loss was known. It is also clear that
the trades did not initially require capital from the trust. In one instance, the
Hogles put up the collateral necessary for a trust to trade on margin. It was
clearly services that Hogle was giving that caused the court to conclude: "In
substance, he gave to the trust in each of those years the profits derived from a
designated portion of his individual efforts. It amounted in each of those years
to a voluntary assignment of a portion of his personal earnings." '
This quotation from Hogle I appears to support the conclusion that Hogle's
trading for the trust was a gift. In Hogle II, however, the court reached the
conclusion that no gift was involved:
The purpose of the [gift tax] statute is to reach and lay a tax upon every
type and kind of transfer of property by gift. With that legislative purpose
in mind, the terms "property," "transfer," "gift," and "indirectly," as used
in the statute, should be interpreted in their broadest and most comprehen-
sive sense. But the tax cannot be sustained unless there was a transferor, a
transferee, and an effective transfer of title or other economic interest or
benefit in property having the quality of a gift.
The net income derived from trading carried on in behalf of the trusts
accrued immediately and directly to the trusts, and did not consist of income
accruing to Hogle which he transferred by anticipatory gift to the trusts.
Hogle never owned an economic interest in such income.4
It is clear from the holding in Dickman that Hogle Irs conclusion that the gift
tax only applies to effective transfers of title or interest in property is no longer
valid.' Furthermore, Hogle II was cited favorably in Crown v. Commis-
sioner," a case holding that there is a distinction between gifts of services and
interest-free loans.' 5 Crown, however, was explicitly overruled by the holding
in Dickman.
Most of the cases that raise these issues are income tax cases. Hogle H
appears to be the only attempt to treat the income tax and the gift tax in pari
materia in the context of a gift of services.46
C. Family Partnerships
Professor Cooper suggested, however, that the use of a family partnership
40. Hogle 1, 132 F.2d at 71.
41. Id.
42. Hogle II, 165 F.2d at 353 (footnotes omitted).
43. See Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 343 (1984); see also supra notes 19-21 (dis-
cussing the holding in Dickman).
44. 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
45. Id. at 241.
46. Professor Cooper gave Hogle H1 only a passing mention. See Cooper, supra note 1, at 180.
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could avoid the difficulties of both the income and gift tax systems. Code sec-
tion 704(e) deals with family partnerships. It provides:
(1) RECOGNITION OF INTEREST CREATED BY PURCHASE OR
GIFT.-A person shall be recognized as a partner for purposes of this subti-
tle if he owns a capital interest in a partnership in which capital is a mate-
rial income-producing factor, whether or not such interest was derived by
purchase or gift from any other person.
(2) DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE OF DONEE INCLUDIBLE IN GROSS
INCOME.-In the case of any partnership interest created by gift, the dis-
tributive share of the donee under the partnership agreement shall be in-
cludible in his gross income, except to the extent that such share is deter-
mined without allowance of reasonable services rendered to the partnership
by the donor, and except to the extent that the portion of such share attribu-
table to donated capital is proportionately greater than the share of the do-
nor attributable to the donor's capital ....
(3) PURCHASE OF INTEREST BY MEMBER OF FAMILY.-For pur-
poses of this section, an interest purchased by one family member from an-
other shall be considered to be created by gift from the seller, and the fair
market value of the purchased interest shall be considered donated capital.
The "family" of any individual shall include only his spouse, ancestors, and
lineal descendants, and any trusts created for the primary benefit of such
persons.4
Professor Cooper saw an abuse for such family partnerships in real estate
ventures:
Among the most impressive uses of family partnerships described to us were
situations which made effective use of borrowed funds to leverage the poten-
tial for shifting value to children. Suppose that a partnership is created for a
new business venture. The father, who is a real estate entrepreneur, becomes
the general and managing partner and makes a modest contribution to capi-
tal. His children become limited partners, making a capital contribution
equal to or even larger than their father's. The substantial funds needed for
the project are borrowed from banks or other independent lenders. To the
extent that the transaction succeeds, the banks or other outside lenders are
paid off and the overriding gains accrue to the children in proportion to their
capital contributions. But if the transaction fails, the parent as general part-
ner is left holding the major share of liability. Thus the child has been
presented with a risk-free opportunity for substantial gain, free of transfer
tax. New [Code sections] 465 [and] 704(e) would preclude use of this lever-
aging technique in many situations, but would have no effect on real estate
transactions, where primary use seems to be made of it."'
Professor Cooper was prophetic. Seven months after his article was pub-
lished, the Tax Court decided Carriage Square, Inc. v. Commissioner."' In
47. I.R.C. § 704(e).
48. Cooper, supra note 1, at 181-82 n.59.
49. 69 T.C. 119 (1977).
[Vol. 41:395
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Carriage Square, the facts were substantially similar to the family partnership
scheme described by Professor Cooper. The only significant difference was that
in Carriage Square there was an intervening corporation as general partner, of
which the father, Arthur Condiotti, was a 79.5 % owner and his tax adviser,
William Barlow, was owner of the balance of the shares. The corporation,
Carriage Square, Inc., contributed $556 to the partnership for a 10% of prof-
its interest. Five trusts each contributed $1000 and each received an 18% of
profits interest. These trusts had been created by $1000 gifts from Mr. Condi-
otti's mother who, coincidentally, received a $5000 gift from Mr. Condiotti
immediately prior to making the gifts.50 The trusts immediately invested in the
partnership, a limited partnership called Sonoma Development Company. The
beneficiaries of the five trusts were Mr. Condiotti, his wife, and his three
children.
Mr. Condiotti would purchase land, taking a loan from both Crocker Bank
and the seller. He would then sell parcels of the land to the partnership, and
the partnership would borrow from the same bank on a continuing guarantee
from Mr. Condiotti and his wife.51 The partnership would then receive a con-
struction loan from Crocker Bank with the same guarantee. As the real estate
development became successful, the loan would be repaid and the substantial
profits would belong to the trusts.
The attitude of the Tax Court can best be summed up in Judge Goffe's
concurrence:
All of the members of the Court recognize that the tax avoidance scheme of
Arthur Condiotti and his accountant-tax adviser, William P. Barlow, cannot
be allowed to stand. It is an obvious attempt, and a somewhat crude at-
tempt, lacking legitimate business purposes, to spread large anticipated
sums of ordinary income among several taxpayer trusts to achieve a low rate
of tax on such income.52
Notwithstanding a unanimity of attitude against these Condiotti family part-
nerships, there is anything but a unanimity of reasoning. The majority's rea-
soning was so convoluted that it at least had the good sense to virtually limit
its own holding to the facts of the case. Even more problematic is that if the
transaction in Carriage Square is not characterized as a taxable gift under the
gift tax rules, the result of the income tax holding exacerbates the gift tax
problem. In an era of 31 % maximum tax rates, spreading income among vari-
ous taxpayers is of limited value. Making tax-free gifts to one's child or the
child's income tax liability, however, is a significantly more dangerous abuse
that Carriage Square appears to allow.
50. In an income-splitting context, this gift followed by a gift back casts some doubt on who is
really the grantor of the trust for purposes of the grantor trust rules. See, e.g., Weigl v. Commis-
sioner, 84 T.C. 1192, 1227 (1985) (holding that the individual controlling the assets in the trust,
and not the person who nominally funded the trust, was the grantor).
51. In Private Letter Ruling 91-13-009, discussed infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text, the
Service has taken the position that a guarantee, of a loan by itself is sufficient to constitute a gift.
52. See Carriage Square, 69 T.C. at 130-31 (Goffe, J., concurring).
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The majority's reasoning is that under the family partnership rules, the cap-
ital borrowed from the Condiottis was not capital at all. Therefore, the bor-
rowed capital was not a "material income producing factor." 5 In addition, the
majority found that there was no bona fide partnership. With regard to bor-
rowed capital, the court found:
Sonoma did employ large amounts of borrowed capital in constructing
houses on the lots which it purchased from the Condiottis. While borrowed
capital, under other circumstances, may be "capital" for section 704(e)(1)
purposes, we hold that it is not in this instance. Petitioner, as Sonoma's only
general partner, was the only partner in Sonoma whose liability for repay-
ment of such borrowed capital was not substantially limited. Furthermore,
Crocker would not have loaned such capital to Sonoma secured by partner-
ship assets (or the general partner's assets) alone, but would loan such capi-
tal to Sonoma only after a continuing guarantee had been executed making
the Condiottis liable for Sonoma's debts to Crocker in the event Sonoma did
not pay them. Since Sonoma made a large profit with a very small total
capital contribution from its partners and was able to borrow, and did bor-
row, substantially all of the capital which it employed in its business upon
the condition that such loans were guaranteed by nonpartners, we think that
section 1.704(e)(1)(i), Income Tax regs., prohibits the borrowed capital in
the instant case from being considered as a "material income-producing fac-
tor." The regulation requires that such capital be "contributed by the
partners."'"
With regard to the existence of a partnership, the court found the transaction
essentially a sham:
We hold, therefore, that Sonoma was not a partnership in which capital
was a material income producing factor and consequently section 704(e)(1)
is inapplicable. However, the trusts must still be recognized as partners un-
less it appears that the parties did not in good faith and acting with a busi-
ness purpose intend to join together as partners ....
We are unable to find that the parties acted with a business purpose be-
cause the trusts received a 90-percent share of Sonoma's profits even though
they made no material contribution to the business. Their capital contribu-
tion was not material since Sonoma could borrow substantially all the
money necessary to conduct its business as long as the Condiottis guaran-
teed its debts (which they did). The trusts provided no services and their
liability was limited to the amount of their contributed capital plus their
share of retained earnings. Furthermore, we cannot find that the parties in
good faith intended to join together as partners where petitioner provided all
the services necessary for the conduct of a partnership business, assumed
substantially all risk of loss, and utilized its business contacts in obtaining
large loans required by the partnership business, but nevertheless was given
53. For a detailed discussion of capital as a material income-producing factor, see Sheldon I.
Banoff et al., Family Partnerships: Capital as a Material Income-Producing Factor, 37 TAX LAW
275 (1984).
54. Carriage Square, 69 T.C. at 127.
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only a share of the partnership profits which was exactly equal to its share
of capital contributions. Accordingly, we hold that the trusts were not bona
fide partners of Sonoma so that respondent correctly allocated the income
earned by Sonoma to petitioner.55
There are some serious problems with the majority's opinion, most of which
are ably identified in Judge Goffe's concurrence. First, the theory adopted by
the court was not argued by either party. Second, the idea that borrowed capi-
tal may not be capital is antithetical to the way in which real estate purchases
are typically financed. Third, distinguishing between general partners and lim-
ited partners is definitional to all limited partnerships and it is clear that a
limited partnership is a recognized form of partnership under subchapter K of
the Code.56
By ignoring the partnership entity existing among the Condiottis and not
applying the family partnership rules, the court taxed the wrong entity. The
one with the unlimited liability was Mr. Condiotti. He is the one who should
have been taxed. The corporation, although having unlimited liability as a
matter of law, did not have sufficient assets to cover possible losses. This point
was argued by Mr. Condiotti but received only a footnote mention in Judge
Tannenwald's dissent.57 Judge Tannenwald did not agree with the decision to
ignore the partnership entity. He argued that Mr. Condiotti, having created
the form of the transaction, ought not be free to ignore the form of the trans-
action and succeed in claiming that substance should prevail over form. Judge
Tannenwald also provided a rationale that is more useful from the point of
view of a gift tax analysis:
The share of partnership income attributable to each trust, while proportion-
ate to the initial capital investments by each partner, was grossly dispropor-
tionate when the role of Condiotti, and particularly the use of his credit
standing, is taken into account. Nor is there any indication that investments
by the trusts were intended to promote the success of the partnership's busi-
ness either through the participation of the trusts or the use of their credit.
In short, I think it more appropriate to treat the trusts' partnership interests
as having been acquired by gift within the meaning of section 704(e)(2).51
Once it is accepted that the interest from the trusts is acquired by gift, then
it follows that the allocation is disproportionate. The issue is whether or not
Judge Tannenwald's logic can be extended to the gift tax itself and not merely
to the family partnership rules. Failure to make the transition will leave open
the use of an S Corporation, which has no equivalent in the family partnership
rules.59 The ability of a trust to hold S Corporation shares is more limited than
55. Id. at 128.
56. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(3)(ii)(c) (1991).
57. Carriage Square, 69 T.C. at 141 n.3 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 140-41 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting).
59. See Cooper, supra note 1, at 185. The Internal Revenue Code allows readjustment of in-
come in an S corporation where, if other family members are shareholders, an individual renders
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the ability of a trust to own a limited partnership interest, but if income tax
spreading is no longer a goal, this can be accomplished by making the trusts
completed gifts for gift tax purposes but grantor trusts for income tax
purposes.60
D. Loan Guarantees
The failure to make such a transition will also leave open the naked guaran-
tee of a child's business loan as a tax-free gift. The Service raised this issue in
Private Letter Ruling 91-13-009.61 In that ruling, the father offered his guar-
antee to allow various of his five children to obtain business loans. The tax-
payer asked for a ruling that such a guarantee did not constitute a gift or at
least, if there was a gift, that it could not be ascertained until such a time in
which payment was made pursuant to the guarantee by the father. Citing
Dickman and Commissioner v. Wemyss,6" the Service stated:
The agreements by T to guarantee payment of debts are valuable economic
benefits conferred upon the shareholders of the acquiring companies and en-
tities. You state that, without guarantees, those shareholders [T's children]
may not have obtained the loans or, in the very least, would have had to pay
a higher interest to obtain the loans. Consequently, when T guaranteed pay-
ment of the loans, T transferred a valuable property interest to the share-
holders. The promisor of a legally enforceable promise for less than ade-
quate and full consideration makes a completed gift on the date the promise
is binding and determinable in value rather than when the promised pay-
ment is actually made.63
The Service, however, did not discuss the issue of how the gift of a guaran-
teed loan is to be valued. The ruling makes clear that another gift occurs when
the guarantee is actually called. If the loan is called at death, while it may be
deductible, it is subject to a corresponding increase in the estate for the right
of reimbursement against the children.
The worst aspect of Private Letter Ruling 91-13-009 relates to the marital
deduction. The ruling holds that the face amount of the marital deduction is
reduced by the face amount of the guarantee, and to the extent it can be
satisfied out of a qualified terminable interest property ("QTIP") trust, it may
cause the loss of the marital deduction for the entire QTIP.6'
services or furnishes capital without reasonable compensation. I.R.C. § 1366(c).
60. The use of grantor trusts has the added advantage of making a tax-free gift of the trusts'
income tax liability.
61. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-13-009 (Dec. 21, 1990).
62. 324 U.S. 303 (1945). Wemyss is cited in Dickman for the proposition that the gift tax was
meant to "hit all the protean arrangements which the wit of man can devise that are not business
transactions within the meaning of ordinary speech." Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330,
335 (1983).
63. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-13-009 (Dec. 21, 1990).
64. See id. The marital deduction aspects of this ruling are beyond the scope of this Article.
For a discussion of these aspects, see generally Jerald D. August & Joseph J. Kulunas, Guaran-
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It is understandable that the Service desires to tax this sort of help. The
folly of attempting to do so, however, is seen by comparing the guarantee of a
loan by a parent to the parent's borrowing the money himself and then lending
it to the child. If the parent loans funds to the child on a demand basis, the
gift taxation of that loan is covered by Code section 7872 on below- market
loans. Section 7872 states that a below-market loan is treated as if the lender
made the loan at market, the borrower paid the lender the market rate of
interest, and the lender then made a gift to the borrower of the difference
between the amount of market interest and the interest actually paid."5 As of
the writing of this Article, that market rate of interest is set by the Code at
6.85%! 6' If the parent borrowed the money from the bank, he would likely pay
a point or two over the lender's prime lending rate." The parent then can
make a tax-free gift of 3 % or 4% per year,68 as section 7872 does not address
the source of the parent's funds. This result is highly ironic: Making a 6.85%
loan is not a taxable gift under the federal gift tax but guaranteeing a loan
that has a lending rate of one or two points over the prime lending rate is
subject to the gift tax.
E. Sending the Child Business
Assisting one's child in business is another potential gift tax abuse men-
tioned by Professor Cooper and addressed obliquely by TAMRA's amend-
ments to section 2036(c). Professor Cooper discusses this topic with reference
to Crowley v. Commissioner," a case involving a parent's use of his business
to help the businesses of his children. In Crowley, Mr. Crowley controlled a
savings and loan association. The business generated various collateral sources
of income, such as appraisal fees, insurance fees, and abstract title policy com-
missions. He established a partnership that was owned equally by his four
minor children. The partnership was established to handle this collateral work
generated by the savings and loan. The oldest child, still in college, had re-
ceived some training in appraisal work and handled such work with his fa-
ther's assistance. The appraisal fees were divided between the savings and loan
and the partnership. His son also acquired a license as an insurance agent so
he could handle the insurance needs of the savings and loan. The Tax Court
held that the income was all taxable to the partnership and not to Mr. Crow-
ley."' Once the Tax Court concluded that the income belonged to the partner-
tees Have Unexpected Gift Tax and Marital Deduction Consequences in IRS Ruling, 74 J. TAX'N
346 (1991).
65. I.R.C. § 7872.
66. Id.
67. As of the writing of this Article, the prime lending rate is 9% so that the parent could
borrow at 10% or 11%.
68. This is the difference between 10% or 11% and the 6.85% rate under I.R.C. § 7872.
69. Cooper, supra note 1, at 184-87 (dicussing Crowley v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 333 (1960)).
70. Crowley v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 333, 345-47 (1960). The Tax Court, however, held
against Mr. Crowley on one issue. The court found that Mr. Crowley provided his children with a
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ship of Mr. Crowley's children, the gift tax issue disappeared.71 This case il-
lustrates some of the limits to which one might want to push the gift tax and
the futility of doing so. There is nothing in the Crowley opinion to indicate
that the prices paid for appraisals or for insurance were more than would have
been paid to an independent third party. Nevertheless, a college student with
no prior experience would have a difficult time, without such parental assis-
tance, in obtaining such an appraisal business. The insurance is a somewhat
easier case not to treat as a taxable gift since the son was licensed, and pre-
sumably it takes some ability to pass an insurance proficiency test. Even then,
however, that only ameliorates the gift tax issue with respect to the son in the
business, not to the other children in the partnership. The son, after all, could
have gone to work as an employee of the father and received some of the same
benefits. What was occurring was not exactly a transfer of goodwill from the
father to the partnership, because the partnership presumably had none until
the son could build some reputation on his own. Rather, it was simply a busi-
ness opportunity that the son and his siblings had not earned on the basis of
ability and experience. Trying to tax this as a gift, however, is next to impossi-
ble. The same could be said for hiring the son as an employee if he were not
otherwise qualified. If a transfer tax is to be exacted at all on job or business
opportunities, one hopes it will be imposed on the underlying corporation and
not the parent.
F. Lifetime Gifts of Partnership Interests
A partnership between parents and children can produce additional difficul-
ties. A situation with which I am personally familiar involves a father and two
sons. For many years, the father was a successful lawyer with a unique niche,
involving both contacts and considerable legal skill. For most of those years,
he hired associates but never made them his partner. Finally, his sons gradu-
ated law school and joined their father at a wage scale identical to unrelated
associates. For the next six or seven years, the sons were treated no differently
from other associates with respect to compensation. The sons, however, were
given special training and introduced to the father's very valuable contacts.
After six or seven years, at about the same time that most 200-lawyer law
firms were making associates partners, the father made the sons partners for
gift when he loaned money to the partnership at 2 / % interest and the partnership reloaned the
funds at a higher rate to a loan customer whom Mr. Crowley had already identified. Id. Section
7872 of the Code would now reach a similar result. See I.R.C. § 7872.
71. The Service actually attempted to place a gift tax on these situations after losing a related
income tax case in Fischer v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 507 (1945) and 8 T.C. 732 (1947), acq., Rev.
Rul. 8-732, 1947-1 C.B. 2. In the former case, the Tax Court held that a bona fide partnership
existed between a father and his two sons and was therefore recognized for income tax purposes.
In the latter case, the Service attempted to assess a gift tax based on a gift of two-thirds of the
partnership. The Tax Court held that the bona fide nature of the transaction was established in
the income tax case, which was determinative of the issue in the gift tax case, and that therefore
there was no taxable gift.
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about the same compensation they would have received as partners at a larger
firm. It is safe to say that at this point in time the sons had considerable skill
in the firm's legal specialty.
As soon as the sons were proficient, a subtle change came about. The fa-
ther's two weeks per year in Florida became four, the four weeks became
eight, and the eight weeks became six months. The father's share of profits
declined and the sons' share of profits increased to reflect the changed contri-
butions of time and effort. Finally, the father retired and his capital account
was paid out. The net result was that the sons owned 100% of the law practice
without a transfer tax ever having been paid. At least the sons in my example
were eventually pulling their weight. The transfer of limited partnership inter-
ests, as in Carriage Square, presents an easier issue to resolve in favor of a
taxable gift, although even on this issue there is some bothersome language to
be found in case law, again in an income tax context. It involves the question
of whether goodwill owned by an individual is transferrable.
In Bateman v. United States,7" the taxpayers transferred limited partnership
interests in Bateman Brokerage Company ("BBC"), a food brokerage com-
pany, to trusts for their children. The district court held that the goodwill was
a capital asset and belonged to BBC, not to the Bateman brothers personally.
The Ninth Circuit majority held that the district court's finding was not
clearly erroneous, and thus affirmed its holding. The Ninth Circuit also upheld
the conclusion that the goodwill capital was a material income producing fac-
tor, and therefore section 704(e) required the earnings to be taxed to the
trusts, not to the Batemans."8 The troubling language of the opinion from the
gift tax perspective is the following: "We agree with Judge Wright's dissent to
the extent that had the goodwill been personal to the Batemans, the transfers
of interest to the trusts would not have received tax recognition." 7' This lan-
guage, if not limited to the application of Code section 704(e), would indicate
that personal goodwill is not transferable.
Actual gift tax cases on transfer of partnership interests are old and gener-
ally not favorable to the government. In Rothrock v. Commissioner,76 two par-
ents (themselves unrelated) brought their sons into their partnership, gradu-
ally increasing the sons' partnership interests over the years. The taxable year
at issue, 1941, was the year of the most recent amendment of the partnership
agreement. The business of the partnership was dealing in foodstuffs on a bro-
kerage and commission basis. The success of the business apparently depended
on the personal relationships of the salesmen, primarily the four partners, and
the food suppliers. The Tax Court, in holding for the taxpayer, avoided the
issue of whether valuable contacts could be the subject of a taxable gift:
[T]he business by itself possessed no substantial element of future earning
72. 490 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1973).
73. Id. at 553.
74. Id.
75. 7 T.C. 848 (1946), acq., Rev. Rul. 7-848, 1946-2 C.B. 4.
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power or good will, but that, on the contrary, its income was derived primar-
ily from personal services, so that different participants with similar abili-
ties, experience and contacts could have organized a comparable venture
and enjoyed a parallel success from their contribution of time, skills, and
services .... This factor, coupled with the proven capacity of the respective
sons and the value of the business of their contributions, results in our in-
ability to discover any gift of interests, tangible or intangible, direct or indi-
rect, to which the tax could attach.7"
It is not clear from the Rothrock opinion whether the fathers passed on con-
tacts to the sons or whether the sons developed the contacts themselves, al-
though there is some language that makes it appear that the sons developed
their own contacts.77
Cohn v. Commissioner7 8 provides an easier justification for a taxpayer vic-
tory. The founder of the business and petitioner in the case, Sigmund Cohn,
had a successful business of buying and selling rare metals to jewelry manu-
facturers. His son and nephew entered the business, and starting around 1920,
expanded the business by beginning to manufacture made-to-order industrial
fine wire and ribbon. Mr. Cohn, however, lacked the technical expertise for
this new line of business. On an informal basis, Mr. Cohn compensated his son
and nephew until an audit gave rise to a challenge by the Commissioner of the
reasonableness of the compensation. After this challenge, Mr. Cohn formal-
ized the partnership with the son and nephew to guarantee them a share of the
profits. The Tax Court had an easy time holding that no gift resulted from the
creation of the partnership:
[I]f we balance the improvements in position, if any, of Adolph [son] and
Sidney [nephew] before the partnership against their definite losses upon
entering into the partnership and their increased personal liability for the
partnership, it is difficult to see that the two junior members of the partner-
ship did anything but lose by the transaction. If, however, it might be con-
tended that an improvement did result, certainly that improvement would be
no more than these two men had earned by over twenty years of faithful
service and hard work. As a result of that service and work they acquired
experience, knowledge and business contacts that were in addition to their
financial returns from their employment by Sigmund Cohn. When, at the
time of the partnership they threw these additional assets into the partner-
ship business they certainly more than paid for any imaginary advantage
which the partnership brought to them. 79
The government's lone victory in these series of cases in the mid-1940s was
76. Id. at 858 (emphasis added).
77. Id. The partnership's primary business prior to 1940 was decimated by Federal Trade Com-
mission victories against the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company (A&P) and against the part-
nership with the result that the partnership was forced to rely on expansion of its relatively small
business in government contracts, an expansion that proved successful. Id. at 854.
78. 6 T.C.M. (CCH) 865 (1947).
79. Id. at 869.
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Gross v. Commissioner.8" In Gross, the petitioner had developed a successful
skin product and a soap named, respectively, Mazon and Mazon Soap. He had
previously brought his wife into the business as a 20% partner. In bringing
their daughter and son-in-law into their partnership, the parents attempted to
accomplish something of an early version of an asset freeze, at least to the
point of trying to avoid gift taxes, by freezing the initial capital accounts of
the parents at 100% of the then-capital accounts of the partnership and giving
the daughter and son-in-law each a 10% of profits interest. Holding that the
trade name, goodwill, and formula were the crucial assets of the business, the
court found it irrelevant that the parents had retained existing capital:
Thai [trade name, goodwill, and formula were] what created the earnings.
And that, under the agreement, must remain in the business even if peti-
tioner withdraws. It follows that if we must isolate and identify what peti-
tioner gave and the donees received, that can readily be done.
Other necessary elements are even more in evidence. The close family
relationship supports inferences both of a lack of adequate consideration and
of a donative intent. Nothing appears in the record to justify concrete find-
ings as to the contribution made by the Eckerts [daughter and son-in-law],
its precise nature, its value, or its function in the partnership's organization.
But if, even in the absence of evidence we speculate as to the purposes of the
transaction, the assumption that the services of the Eckerts were of some
value to the business advances us little. Although their previous compensa-
tion, presumably for the same services, had run to around $20,000 to
$35,000 annually, they received between them a 20 percent interest in earn-
ings, which, for the current year, and excluding officers' salaries, were up-
ward of $370,000 and, for the first year of the new arrangement, netted
them over $100,000. It is not unreasonable to suppose that some part of the
increase flowed from the newly acquired interest in the business itself and its
principal asset, and that this, being inadequately supported by any consider-
ation, was to some extent a gift.8'
A significant element of the case was that the tax court viewed capital as an
income-producing factor and viewed with distrust the sudden increase in
compensation.
It is not surprising that most of the cases discussed above arose as income
tax cases rather than gift tax cases. Prior to 1976, there were highly progres-
sive income tax rates and relatively modest gift tax rates. For each donor, the
first $3000 per donee per year plus the first $30,000 lifetime were gift-tax free,
after which rates began at 2/4 %, did not exceed 30% until lifetime gifts ex-
ceeded $1,250,000, and did not exceed 50% until lifetime gifts exceeded $5
million.82 For married couples, the dollar figures were doubled if the couple
80. 7 T.C. 837 (1946), acq., Rev. Rul. 7-837, 1946-2 C.B. 2.
81. Id. at 837 (citations omitted).
82. I.R.C. § 2502(a), amended by Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 2001(b)(1), (d)(2), Pub. L. No.
94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). This compares
with income tax rates in 1991, which do not exceed 31%, and gift tax rates, which start at 37%
once the $600,000 lifetime unified credit is exceeded and exceed 50% over $2.5 million. I.R.C. §§
I Inn 1 (c).
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elected to split gifts83 or if both spouses were wealthy enough to make their
own gifts.
G. Interest-Free Loans
The Service had a good record of success while pursuing the gift tax on
interest-free term loans. Once one established a market rate of interest, one
could, by familiar net present valuation methods, calculate the present value of
the required loan repayments, subtract that value from the proceeds loaned,
and tax the difference as a gift.8' In Crown v. Commissioner,8" however, the
taxpayer succeeded in persuading the Seventh Circuit that in the case of an
interest-free demand loan, the gift was impossible to value since the loan could
be recalled at any time. This followed a small number of taxpayer victories on
the same issue.86 The Crown family had loaned $18 million to family trusts on
an interest-free, demand note basis. When the Eleventh Circuit, in Dickman v.
Commissioner,87 decided to the contrary, the United States Supreme Court
resolved the conflict of circuits against the taxpayer.88 Shortly thereafter, Con-
gress codified Dickman, at least in terms of monetary loans, in enacting Code
section 7872.89
Code section 7872 requires Congress to provide a federal rate for various
loan periods: short term (under three years), intermediate term (three to nine
years), and long term (over nine years).90 Term loans with an interest rate
lower than the established federal rate result in an immediate gift of the dif-
ference between the amount of the proceeds and the value of the repayments
using the applicable federal rate. With a demand loan, however, the gift is
determined annually. The determination is made using the adjusted federal
rate (short term), assuming that on the last day of the year the amount of
interest was in fact paid to the lender who in turn made a gift back to the
borrower. The statute thus has gift tax consequences in the case of a gift loan
and income tax consequences in the case of either a gift loan or an employer-
employee loan.
Dickman, however, went beyond monetary gifts. The Supreme Court spoke
in terms of rights in property, expressly avoiding the question of applying gift
83. See I.R.C. § 2513.
84. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 204 (1953).
85. 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
86. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73, 77 (N.D. Tex. 1966) ("The time has
not yet come when a parent must suddenly deal at arm's length with his children when they finish
their education and start out in life."); Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083, 1086 (1961) (hold-
ing that "an interest-free loan results in no taxable gain to the borrower").
87. 690 F.2d 812 (1th Cir. 1982), affd, 465 U.S. 330 (1984).
88. See Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330 (1984); supra text accompanying notes 19-21
and accompanying text (discussing Dickman).
89. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 699 (1964) (codified at I.R.C. § 7872). Code section 7872
attached income tax consequences to interest-free loans as well. Id.
90. I.R.C. § 1274(d)(1)(A).
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tax principles to the proverbial loan of a cup of sugar." Dickman, however,
did not address the question of when gift tax liability attaches. Dickman
would, by its terms, apply to the loan of a valuable painting to a child that
hangs on the wall of the child's home." With its emphasis on property, how-
ever, it is not clear that Dickman applies to a loan of goodwill such as where
the parent with valuable experience goes to work for a corporation owned by
his minor children. This scenario is one of Professor Cooper's concerns and
close to the facts of Crowley."
An experienced parent working for his child's corporation, however, runs
some risk that the time invested in the corporation will be assigned to the
parent. Under the assignment-of-income doctrine, income is taxed to the indi-
vidual who earns it.9 ' Therefore, it is arguable that the time invested by the
parents is the goodwill of the parent, and not of the child's infant corporation,
which earned the money. Could the assignment-of-income doctrine be applied
to a parent giving his child investment advice?
Professor Cooper gives the following example:
One planner, familiar with the activities of real estate speculators, de-
scribed how such a person with whom he was acquainted diverts his talents
to the benefit of his children. This planner explained that the speculator
looks at a hundred deals for every one in which he finally invests. This
screening process is a sophisticated full-time activity. By enabling his chil-
dren to participate in the deal finally selected, the parent is in effect giving
them immensely valuable services. '
What is the value of the gift and when is it given? If assignment-of-income
principles are not applicable, presumably one must find that the value of the
gift is the value of the commissions or hourly time of the investment advisor.
In Professor Cooper's example, there is no bargain sale of the purchased asset
so that there is no gift element present in the form of a below-market purchase
price. The assets are purchased in an arm's-length transaction from unrelated
parties at fair market value.
Code section 2036(c) attempted to look at end results as opposed to time
91. Dickman, 465 U.S. at 340-41.
92. I.R.C. § 2503(g) provides an express exemption for the loan of art work to a § 501(c)(3)
organization other than a private foundation if the use of such work is related to its exempt
purposes. By implication, the loan of art work to anyone else is a taxable gift, an implication with
which the Senate Finance Committee agrees: "Present Law.-A loan of a work of art to a public
charity or a private operating foundation is treated as a transfer subject to Federal gift tax. Al-
though constituting a gift, such a loan is not a deductible charitable contribution for Federal gift
tax purposes." REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, S. REP. No. 445, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 402 (1988).
93. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and holding in Crowley
v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 333 (1960)).
94. See generally MERTEN'S THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 5.24ff (Martin Wein-
stein ed., 1991). The assignment-of-income doctrine was initially formulated in the classic case of
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
95. Cooper, supra note 1, at 185 n.67.
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value of money in section 7872. If a parent transferred rights to appreciation,
and retained rights to income or voting, the parent was deemed to have re-
tained the transferred interest until the parent disposed of his interest, the
child transferred his interest outside of the family, or the parent died. This
statute was geared to a specific wrong (asset freezes) although it encompassed
a good many nonabusive situations."
Newly enacted Chapter 14 of the Code9 reverts to exacting a transfer tax
based on values at the time of transfer, but allows a backward look if facts
prove otherwise. Chapter 14 provides that, with regard to corporate reorgani-
zations, the retained interest must possess certain required characteristics or it
will be valued at zero" with the result that the amount of the gift will be
deemed to be the value of the retained and transferred interests combined.
Among the characteristics required is a certain return. 99 The backward look
comes if that certain return is not realized; in this situation there is a gift of
the failure to receive the return, limited by any increase in the value of the
enterprise after the initial gift. There is a similar rule with regard to split
interest trusts but it excludes the backward look. 00
In sum, the Service's attempts to reach gifts of opportunity under the gift
tax have met with mixed success. The Service, however, had a certain degree
of success in its attempts to tax the gift of the use of property. Of greatest
import is that nonproperty transfers, such as the transfer of business contracts,
generally escape the gift tax system.
II. THE DIFFICULTY OF VALUATION
Valuation of businesses is another area that confounds the government's
task of fairly taxing closely held businesses. The wealthiest of closely held bus-
iness owners, however, can afford sophisticated tax advice, which can reduce
their liability to a lower effective tax rate than smaller business owners may
secure. Minority discounts, blockage, and lack of marketability are factors for
96. It may be argued that all estate tax freezes are abusive, although I suggest that that is not
the case. It is one thing where the senior generation is responsible for the growth of the business
and remains active after transferring appreciation rights to children. Where the senior generation
actually retires, however, it is defensible that all future growth should belong to the junior genera-
tion. See, for example, Cohn v. Commissioner, 6 T.C.M. (CCM) 865 (1947) (discussed supra
notes 78-79 and accompanying text), where the transfer of a business to a junior generation al-
ready contributing to the business did not result in any tax liability for an alleged gift of opportu-
nity. New Chapter 14 of the Code, I.R.C. §§ 2701-2704, should allow the nonabusive situation to
be adequately treated.
97. I.R.C. §§ 2701-2704.
98. I.R.C. § 2701(a)(3)(A).
99. Under I.R.C. § 2701(c)(3), a "qualified payment" is a dividend determined at a fixed rate
or a rate that bears a fixed relationship to a market rate. Under I.R.C. § 2702(b), however, for a
retained interest in trust not to be valued at zero, it must be a "qualified interest" that consists of
the right to receive a fixed amount payable not less frequently than annually or a fixed percentage
of the fair market value of the property of the trust, determined annually.
100. See I.R.C. § 2702(a)(2)(A).
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which valuation discounts are permitted. Good tax planners, adept at manipu-
lating these factors, can save taxpayers substantial sums.
Professor Cooper focused a considerable amount of attention on the
problems with the current transfer tax structure, the difficulty of valuation,
and the government's failure to get results that fit the underlying purposes of
the transfer tax statutes. 1 ' The government, according to Professor Cooper,
comes into litigation now conceding too much.102 He calls it the case of disap-
pearing value. 03
Removing closely held businesses from the transfer tax system does not pro-
duce perfect results. There are some very large closely held businesses that
presumably have some passive investors. 0 ' I suggest, however, that removing
closely held businesses from taxation is a preferable alternative to the valua-
tion difficulties existing in the transfer tax structure today.
A. Basic Valuation Principles
The basic statement of the fair market value of a business is "the net
amount which a willing purchaser, whether an individual or a corporation,
would pay for the interest of a willing seller, neither being under any compul-
sion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant
facts."105 The difficulty with this definition is that within a family context, it is
possible to place restrictions and conditions on shares or partnership interests,
or to create minority interests, that would genuinely lower the value of the
business to a disinterested purchaser. These involve rights that the family has
no intention of exercising or restrictions that do not restrict anything the fam-
ily may wish to do. It is the existence of preferred dividends that nobody in-
tended to pay, or conversion rights of preferred stock to common stock that
nobody intended to exercise, that were the concerns of the Service in its attack
on asset freezes.
B. Minority Discounts, Blockage, and Lack of Marketability
Among the factors acting to depress the value of closely held businesses for
estate tax purposes are minority discounts, lack of marketability, and block-
age. Minority discounts simply recognize that a lack of voting control may
101. Cooper, supra note 1, at 201. For a contrary view, see Richard L. Dees, The Slaying of
Frankenstein's Monster: The Repeal and Replacement of Section 2036(c), TAXES, Mar. 1991, at
151, 154.
102. Cooper, supra note 1, at 201.
103. Id. at 195-204; see also Mary L. Fellows & William H. Painter, Valuing Close Corpora-
tions for Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes: A Statutory Solution to the Disappearing Wealth Syn-
drome, 30 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1978) (presenting a comprehensive solution to the problem of
valuing closely held corporations for purposes of transfer taxation).
104. For example, in Newhouse v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 193 (1990), the Service established
that, without discounts, the value of Mr. Newhouse's interest in his corporation exceeded $1
billion.
105. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-3 (1956).
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inhibit a nonfamily buyer from buying into a family situation.10 6 Lack of mar-
ketability is a situation in which the stock may not be easily sold, thereby
depressing its value.107 Blockage is a phenomenon unique to publicly traded
shares. Blockage may occur when more shares are sold in a short amount of
time than the market can absorb, and the bulk sale itself depresses prices.
Restrictions on the disposition of the stock also depress values, either because
of binding buy-sell agreements or because other classes of stock may have
rights that affect the value of the shares to be valued. John A. Wallace, one of
this country's leading estate planning practitioners, has suggested that deliber-
ate tax planning to decrease valuation can produce favorable transfer tax re-
sults, and he has given some very well reasoned approaches.108
C. Notable Taxpayer Victories
Professor Cooper cited some wonderful examples of valuation discounts that
opened the door to wholesale abuse. 109 It is not surprising that the examples
keep coming. Professor Cooper cited Whittemore v. Fitzpatrick,1 0 where vari-
ous discounts succeeded in having an effective rate of estate tax of 7%,"' and
Dean v. Commissioner,"' where the percentage savings was not as great but
the amount of taxes saved was in the tens of millions of dollars. a
In terms of sheer dollar amount, nothing will match the drubbing the Ser-
vice took in Newhouse v. Commissioner.14 Samuel Newhouse died in 1979,
owning ten shares of Class A (voting) common stock and 990 shares of Class
B (nonvoting) common stock of Advance Publications, Inc ("Advance"). Ad-
vance was a giant media conglomerate whose retained earnings from 1977 to
1979 averaged $460 million and whose operating income averaged just over
$160 million for the same period. 15 Newhouse owned all of the outstanding
common stock of Advance at his death. Preferred shares were owned as fol-
106. See Gallun v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. 1316 (1974); see also Louis S. Harrison, The
Strategic Use of Lifetime Giving Programs to Reduce Estate Taxes in Light of Recent Congres-
sional and Internal Revenue Service Antipathy Towards Transfer Tax Reduction Devices. 40
DEPAUL L. REv. 365, 378-84 (1991) (discussing the valuation problems associated with minority
discounts); John M. Janiga & Louis S. Harrison, Valuation of Closely Held Stock for Transfer
Tax Purposes: The Current Status of Minority Discounts for Intrafamily Transfers in Family-
Controlled Corporations, TAXES, May 1991, at 309, 316-17 (same).
107. Central Trust Co. v. United States, 305 F.2d 393, 405 (Cl. Ct. 1962).
108. John A. Wallace, Now You See It, Now You Don't-Valuations Conundrums in Estate
Planning, in 24 U. MIAMI EST. PLAN. INST. 1 800, 803.1 (1990).
109. See Cooper, supra note 1, at 197-99.
110. 127 F. Supp. 710 (D. Conn. 1954).
111. Cooper, supra note 1, at 198.
112. 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 281 (1960).
113. Cooper, supra note 1, at 199.
114. 94 T.C. 193 (1990), nonacq., Rev. Proc. 94-193, 1991-7 I.R.B. 5.




Mitzi Newhouse (wife) 1000 shares
S.I. Jr. (son) 750 shares
Donald (son) 750 shares
Ted (brother) 500 shares
Norman (brother) 500 shares"'
In 1974, the company and the preferred shareholders 17 signed a share-
holder agreement that severely limited the rights of preferred shareholders.
The shareholder agreement provided for certain rights and restrictions. The
agreement gave the company the following: (1) a right of first refusal over any
sale to an outsider; and (2) the right to force a sale at an "agreed" price or as
otherwise determined by Chemical Bank.118 In addition, upon the death of a
preferred shareholder, the personal representative of the shareholder could re-
quire Advance to purchase the shares, but the price for this put could not
exceed the estate's cost for taxes, funeral expenses, and administrative ex-
penses. 119 The preferred shares, however, were entitled to 78% of all divi-
dends. The preferred shares had a liquidation preference of $187.25 per share.
The common shares exclusively elected the Board of Directors. The preferred
shares were entitled to vote on voluntary liquidations.
The estate reported the ten shares of Class A common stock at $8,595,000
and the 990 shares of class B common stock at $170,181,000. The Commis-
sioner, however, valued the Class A common stock at $420 million and the
Class B common stock at $811,800,000.120
What allowed the low valuation? Two words: intentional confusion. The Tax
Court described the state of the rights of the various classes of stock this way:
There are three basic methods for a shareholder to realize value from a
corporation: (1) the redemption of stock, (2) the payment of dividends or
distributions, and (3) a merger or liquidation in which stock is cashed out or
exchanged for value. Consequently, the rights and privileges of the various
classes of Advance stock determine the constraints on a purchaser of the
Advance common stock in attempting to realize the value of his purchase.
On February 29, 1980, a buyer of the Advance common stock could have
elected the Board of Directors. The preferred stock, however, could vote on
and block corporate liquidation. On February 29, 1980, the Advance pre-
ferred stock could not be redeemed without the preferred shareholders' con-
sent. The preferred stock could vote on any charter change that affected its
class rights or gave new class rights or authorized a new class of stock. The
116. Id.
117. Originally, these included all but Mitzi, who signed the shareholder agreement in 1978.
Id. at 203.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 202-03.
120. The Commissioner originally sought fraud penalties, but these penalties were conceded by
the time the tax court rendered its decision. Id. Shares of Newhouse Broadcasting Company were
also assets involved in the case. Id.
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preferred shareholders were entitled to 78 percent of all dividends declared
out of current and retained earnings; the common stock was entitled to 22
percent.
The allocation of all other rights and privileges pertaining to shareholders
is unclear. The preferred shareholders might be entitled to participate
equally in dividends declared from capital surplus. It is not clear whether a
buyer of the Advance common stock could effect a merger to eliminate or
cash-out the preferred shareholders. It is also unclear what price the com-
mon shareholders would have to pay to preferred shareholders in an ap-
praisal proceeding or a fair value proceeding under New York law. The ex-
tent of the disagreement over the rights and privileges of the classes of
Advance stock under New York law would be certain to result in litigation
in the event that the common shareholder attempted to cash-out the pre-
ferred stock through a merger or otherwise attempted to effect a construc-
tive redemption or liquidation that returned less than 78 percent of the value
of Advance to the preferred shareholders.""
There is not the slightest indication that there was any hostility within the
Newhouse family. Each time the corporate structure was reorganized, it was
the result of a voluntarily signed agreement. Yet, using the willing-
buyer-willing-seller standard, the value of the company was reduced by the
uncertainty of corporate rights. The same argument could be used -in valuing
the preferred stock with the result that the whole would be greater than the
sum of its parts.
What the government attempted to do was come to the proper state-law
conclusion and value the shares accordingly. Notwithstanding some impressive
expert testimony for the government, the Tax Court rejected the government's
position. If experts could disagree on state law before the Tax Court, a pro-
spective purchaser could not be certain of the rights of a stockholder."'
A second approach taken by the government and rejected by the Tax Court
was a residual approach to valuing the common shares. 128 In advocating the
residual approach, the government valued the entire corporation, subtracted
the value of the preferred shares, and took the position that the value of the
common shares was this difference. The Tax Court, however, held that nobody
would advise a willing buyer to buy on the residual approach. 24
As commentators point out, "the moral of the story seems to be that the
more complex a case is, the more confused the government is likely to get.' 2 5
The government refused to approach the case from the point of view of a
willing buyer, notwithstanding the demands of the Supreme Court's pro-
121. Id. at 203-04.
122. Id. at 232-33.
123. The residual or subtraction approach is specifically adopted in proposed regulations under
Chapter 14 of the Code. See Explanation of Provisions-Subtraction Method, 56 Fed. Reg.
14,322 (1991), reprinted in The Daily Tax Reporter, April 5, 1991, L-4.
124. Newhouse v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 193, 233 (1990).
125. Howard M. McCue & Thomas P. Gallanis, Jr., The Newhouse Case: Complexity Results
in a Low Value for Common Stock, 25 TR. & EsT. 54, 54-55 (1990).
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nouncement in United States v. Cartwright126 and its own regulations. As long
as such a standard exists, and planning can be done such as in Newhouse, the
government cannot win.
The government's losses do not always come from good planning by the
taxpayer. In Neff v. Commissioner,' the government lost from what must be
described as either the finesse of the taxpayer's counsel or simply a bad
decision.
One of the most basic tenets of valuation is that the best indicator of market
value is actual arms' length sales within a reasonable time of the valuation








Cash on hand at Rand
McNally-$17,000,000 plus
$5,000,000 note from Houghton
Mifflin.
78,858.5 shares were purcahsed
at $32 per share from Frederick
McNally, who wanted to be
cashed out after he was fired.
Total redemption
price-$2,426,512.
Rand McNally made an offer to
purchase up to 236,672 shares
for cash at $32 per share and to
convert another 156,250 shares
to preferred which would
eventually be redeemed at $32
per share over the next four
years.
Edwin Neff died owning 25,960
shares of Rand McNally in a
revocable trust.
278 shares purchased from
Chandler Everett at $32 per
share.
126. 411 U.S. 546, 557 (1973).
127. 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 669 (1989).
128. See Estate of Andrews v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 938, 941 (1982) ("In determining the
value of unlisted stocks, actual arm's-length sales of such stock in the normal course of business
within a reasonable time before or after the valuation date are the best criteria of market value.").
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September 21, 1982 Marion Clow died owning
118,314 shares of Rand
McNally. 12 9
The government argued, not surprisingly, for a value of $32 per share. The
taxpayer argued that the April 7 to May 7 offer had expired, that the offer
had involved a premium to assure its goal of reducing the number of share-
holders,180 and that a new buyer could not be certain that Rand McNally
would be willing to purchase shares in the future. The court accepted the tax-
payer's argument. The court then proceeded to go into standard analysis in-
cluding capitalization of earnings and discounts for lack of marketability. The
court concluded that the value of Neff's shares was $21 per share and the
value of Clow's was $20 per share."' Rather than use actual, recent arms'
length sales, the court hypothesized a different set of circumstances in the
future. Amazing!
D. A Modest Government Victory
The Service has had one recent victory of sorts where the decedent gave
away two small gifts of shares that were just enough to put her holdings below
50% of her estate eighteen days before her death. In Estate of Murphy v.
Commissioner, " 2 the decedent was advised to give away enough to make her
interest in the corporation a minority interest and thereby lower the tax on the
estate. In order to avoid granting a minority discount, the court had to find
something of a step transaction--one transaction that the taxpayer has broken
into two transactions solely for tax avoidance:
During the 18-day period between the lifetime gifts of the stock to dece-
dent's two children and her death, decedent continued to be chairman of the
board and her two children held the two top management positions. We
believe that all concerned intended nothing of substance to change between
the time of transfer and the time of her death and that nothing of substance
did change. 88
There are some problems with the court's logic, although the result seems
correct. It is difficult to conceive dying as the second part of a two-part, tax-
avoidance step transaction. The concept of "gift in contemplation of death"
under Code section 2035 was changed in 1976 for an automatic inclusion in
the decedent's gross estate for gifts within three years of death.'8 ' Under ei-
ther the contemplation-of-death rule or the automatic three-year rule, the tax-
129. Neff, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) at 671-73.
130. This would seem to argue in favor of a limitation on the shareholder that he offer all, but
not less than all, of his shares. There is no indication that this was part of the offer.
131. Neff, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) at 676.
132. 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 645 (1990).
133. Id. at 659.
134. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 455, 90 Stat. 172, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. §
2001(a)(5) (enacting I.R.C. § 2035).
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payer in Murphy would have clearly lost. The three-year rule of Code section
2035, however, was repealed with the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.131
The Tax Court in Murphy had to make a significant stretch in logic to
reach its conclusion of no minority discount. The court noted that certain
Ways and Means Committee hearings indicated that the only effect of Code
section 2035, after the unification of gift and estate tax rates, was to tax
postgift appreciation, and for that limited purpose it was unnecessary to retain
it in the Code. 186 The court then proceeded to state that "we see no basis in
the statute or legislative history for petitioner's view that Congress intended
the control premium to escape transfer taxation because of the 1981 amend-
ments to section 2035. ''137 The court never addressed the fact that the repeal
of section 2035 took the concept of adding gift shares back to the donor's gross
estate out of the law, notwithstanding that the abuse in Murphy was not one
of the reasons behind repealing section 2035. The court went on to note that
section 2035 still applied if what is given up is a retained life estate within
three years of death, and further suggested that the decedent retained control
of the corporation until her death.188 After making the suggestion, however,
the court did not reach a conclusion based on the decedent's retained control,
since neither of the parties argued the point. It is significant that the court
made clear that it was not applying any sort of attribution rules.13 9 This single
government victory, sustainable as a matter of overall policy, does not stand
scrutiny in close analysis. The careful planning of the taxpayer should have
worked. This case, taken in concert with the taxpayer victories, demonstrates
the impossible position in which the Service finds itself under the current sys-
tem. Some sort of departure from fair market value as a tax base is warranted,
either in removing closely held businesses from the transfer tax system or bas-
ing the tax on something other than fair market value.
135. Pub. L. No. 34, 95 Stat. 172, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 424(a) (enacting I.R.C. § 2035(d)).




139. See Janiga & Harrison, supra note 106, at 315 (arguing that, notwithstanding the Tax
Court's statement that it was not applying attribution rules, "the court's reasoning is laced with
language that suggests a family attribution theme"). The authors cite two cases that give some
authority for attribution in determining minority discounts. In Blanchard v. United States, 291 F.
Supp. 348 (D. Iowa 1968), 1048 out of 2000 shares of a corporation were owned by related
entities. The taxpayer gave her 458 shares to six trusts for grandchildren and took a minority
discount. Shortly thereafter, all 1048 shares, including the 458 recently given, were sold for a
higher price. The district court held that the higher price was appropriate. Id. at 352. It is argua-
ble whether this is attribution or application of the theory that proximate sales are the best evi-
dence of value.
In Driver v. United States, 76-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 13,155 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 13, 1976),
the sole owner of a corporation made two gifts of 40% interests in two consecutive years, for a
total gift of 80% of the corporate shares. The district court in effect stepped the transactions and
viewed the transfers as a single transfer of a controlling interest. Id.
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III. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS
A number of proposals have surfaced from time to time to eliminate inequi-
ties in the current transfer tax system. They are not aimed exclusively at
closely held businesses. As applied to closely held businesses and the abuses
discussed in this Article, they meet with mixed success.
A. Valuation Proposals
In 1987, the House of Representatives passed a measure designed to curb
valuation abuses.1 40 The House bill would have provided that the value of
stock is presumed to be its pro rata share of all shares of that class, and that
for the purpose of rebutting the presumption, an individual is deemed to own
shares owned by his family. The provision died in joint committee.14 1 It should
be noted that the 1987 proposal would not have helped the government in
Newhouse, since Newhouse used different classes of stock.' 42
Another proposal was to cumulate, for valuation purposes of each class of
stock, all prior gratuitous transfers by the same owner."18 This has the merit of
catching abuses such those as in Murphy without having to stretch logic as the
Tax Court did. But again, this proposal will not prevent situations such as
those in Newhouse. Not only was the problem in Newhouse that the corpora-
tion had different classes of stock, but the holdings of stock by the family were
issued directly by the corporation in a manner in which it appears there was
not a taxable gift under the gift tax" or a transfer from the senior Newhouse
under state property law."'
B. Wealth Tax
Professor Cooper recommends a combination of a wealth tax" 6 with legisla-
tive reforms for valuation of closely held securities. 47 His argument is that a
periodic wealth tax is less intrusive than a periodic estate tax and will make
wealth shifting less important. He has reiterated this suggestion before the
New York Bar Association." 8 These are two separate proposals. With regard
to the gift of opportunity, the wealth tax will succeed in taxing the gain re-
140. See H.R. REP. No. 391, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1043 (1988).
141. See id.
142. See supra notes 114-26 and accompanying text (discussing Newhouse v. Commissioner,
94 T.C. 193 (1990), nonacq., Rev. Proc. 94-193, 1991-7 I.R.B. 5).
143. See Fellows & Painter, supra note 103, at 895.
144. At least that was the case prior to the enactment of I.R.C. § 2036(c) or Chapter 14 of the
Code.
145. The issue was not really discussed in Newhouse because it was not relevant to any of the
issues in the case. See Newhouse v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 193, 203-10 (1990), nonacq., Rev.
Proc. 94-193, 1991-7 I.R.B. 5.
146. See Cooper, supra note 1, at 244-47.
147. Id. at 224-28.
148. See George Cooper, Taking Wealth Taxation Seriously, 34 REc. Ass'N B. OF THE CITY
OF NEW YORK 24 (1979).
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gardless of who has it. With regard to a closely held business, a wealth tax will
not solve the valuation problem. In fact, valuation plus the fear of a flight of
capital are the primary practical problems with a wealth tax where it has been
tried.1 9 Professor Cooper argues that one will not resist valuation disputes on
a year-in and year-out basis for what amounts to a small net tax, whereas one
will expend great effort on an estate tax that occurs once every generation. 5
The problem with Professor Cooper's valuation proposals is that one is still
making assumptions about such things as loss of a key individual or lack of a
market that one cannot know until later. An alternative to Professor Cooper's
proposal is to have a set of rules for valuation based on capitalizing earnings,
but then one might as well have an income tax. Professor Cooper also argues
that a significant part of the wealth in America is in real estate."' Real estate
could have a separate rule without minority discounts. Professor Cooper's sug-
gestion would solve the problems of Carriage Square but not the problem of
my friends inheriting a law practice from their father.
C. Accessions Tax
Another suggestion that has achieved some popularity is an accessions
tax.152 Instead of basing a tax on the amount given or bequeathed by a single
donor, one will tax on a cumulative, lifetime basis the amount received by a
single donee. This has many advantageous features, including: (1) greater neu-
trality by putting a heavier tax on the one who receives the greatest amount of
inheritance; (2) significantly easing the problems with the marital and charita-
ble deductions; and (3) providing certainty for the determination of when a
gift is complete.15 8 There are, however, issues to be worked out regarding gen-
eration-skipping transfers and the deferral of the tax by use of discretionary
trusts. "
In terms of closely held businesses and the gift of opportunity, the acces-
sions tax will, under at least some circumstances, ease the problems of taxing
closely held businesses. By placing property in trust, taxation is deferred, al-
though some parts of the proposal attempt to adjust for that. To the extent
that dividends are passed out to the beneficiaries of the trust, the accessions
tax will have some of the same wait-and-see attributes that this Article recom-
mends. 55 To the degree that the distribution out of trust is shares of stock, the
valuation problems are the same as under the current tax law.
'149. See Verbit, supra note 12, at 3.
150. Cooper, supra note 148, at 34.
151. Id. at 27.
152. See William D. Andrews, The Accessions Tax Proposal, 22 TAX L. REV. 589 (1967);
Edward C. Halbach, An Accessions Tax, 23 REAL PROP. PROB. AND TR. J. 211 (1988).
153. Halbach, supra note 152, at 213, 220-22.
154. Id. at 227-29.




Another proposal involves a consumption tax.' 56 This suggestion includes
gifts and bequests in income, with a deduction for nonconsumable receipts of
gifts and bequests in-kind, such as closely held businesses. Receiving gifts and
bequests of a business would be the equivalent of receipt of cash and full rein-
vestment. The asset received would receive a zero basis.157 This model would
treat my friends taking over their father's law practice the same as a receipt of
shares of stock in a closely held business. In line with this Article's recommen-
dation, there would be no gift or death taxation of closely held businesses.
E. Comprehensive Tax Base
A variant on the consumption tax is the comprehensive tax base, which
again includes gifts and bequests in income. The tax base consists of increases
in wealth plus consumption." Apart from the practical difficulties such a tax
might entail, it is not clear how it would treat closely held businesses. Accord-
ing to Prof. Joseph Dodge, such closely held businesses would theoretically be
included in the tax base, although the proposal could be structured to exclude
them.' 59
Some of the suggested alternatives correct some of the problems of closely
held businesses along the lines of this Article's recommendations. Some pro-
posals do so with more far reaching ramifications. Other proposals do not ad-
dress the problems at all. They compare with this Article's more modest solu-
tions, which do not require overhaul of the existing transfer tax system.
IV. SOLUTIONS
Exempting closely held businesses from transfer taxation eliminates the dis-
parate treatment between transfers of opportunity and service businesses on
the one hand, and transfers of interests in closely held manufacturers and re-
tailers on the other. Such an exemption also eliminates the insurmountable
difficulties of valuing closely held businesses. Finally, exempting closely held
businesses from transfer taxation promotes closely held businesses by not tax-
ing them out of existence.
The question remains, however, that if one insists on taxing transfers of
opportunity, what sorts of things should be taxed? I do not think anyone advo-
cates taxing a parent's giving advice to his children and giving them the bene-
fit of years of experience around the dining room table. In fact, recent changes
in the gift tax show a public policy that exempts gifts of any education, even
the gift of a college education from Princeton.
156. See Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond Gift and Estate Tax Reform: Including Gifts and Bequests
in Income, 91 HARv. L. Rav. 1177 (1978).
157. Id. at 1199.
158. Id. at 1183.
159. Id. at 1199-1200.
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If one insists on taxing such advice, there is a further question of how and
when to value such advice. The gift of one-hundred shares of General Motors
common stock has an identifiable value and the transfer has an identifiable
moment in time. Explaining to one's child over dinner the secrets of being a
good salesperson or the principles of corporate finance is impossible to value,
assuming one can prove that this advice is responsible for the child's success.
To see if it is possible to tax these gifts at all, one must look at them in the
context of what is taxed now.
Transfers of tangible property, publicly traded securities, and cash fit easily
within the current transfer tax system. There is an identifiable moment of
transfer (gift or death), and sections 2033 and 2511 of the Code are adequate
to tax the transfers. There is always a difficulty with valuation, but this is
inherent in any system of taxation, including the income tax. When one is
talking about gifts of opportunity, it seems one would have to wait to deter-
mine any tax. Otherwise, how would one tax an opportunity given, but not
utilized? If the first child passed on an opportunity, but the second child took
advantage of it and made $1 million, has the parent made two $1 million
gifts? Indeed, the idea of an open gift has gained some acceptance in the gift
tax statutes. Code section 7872, Chapter 14 of the Code, and the now-repealed
section 2036(c) of the Code give us examples where Congress felt that one
way to tax a gift, at least in part, was a wait-and-see approach. 160 If some sort
of tax on closely held businesses must be collected, my solution is a combina-
tion of Code section 6166161 and a corporate income tax surcharge. Over a
period of fourteen years,"' a tax should be paid by the corporation based on a
tax base equal to the sum of:
* corporate taxable income, plus
- salaries paid to employees having a certain relationship to the decedent
based on attribution rules, plus
* a percentage of purchases from entities owned by family based on attri-
bution rules,
multiplied by a fraction, the numerator being the percentage of the corpora-
tion owned by the decedent and the denominator being 100%. If the corpora-
tion has multiple classes of stock, there should be alternative calculations
based on number of shares or relative value of shares using whichever fraction
is most favorable to the government.
160. See Dodge, supra note 8, at 255-60; supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text (discussing
section 7872's coverage of below-market loans to children); supra text accompanying notes 32-36
(explaining section 2036(c)'s attempt to stop the use of preferred stock asset freezes to avoid
transfer taxation).
161. I.R.C. § 6166, entitled, "Extension of time for payment of estate tax where estate consists
largely of interest in closely held business," allows for a waiting period of five years and install-
ment payments. I.R.C. § 6166. Where the estate of a decedent consists largely of closely held
businesses, the tax may be paid in installments, the first installment no later than five years after
the time for ordinary payment of estate taxes. Id.
162. The period of 14 years is chosen only because it is the maximum deferral period allowed
under I.R.C. § 6166.
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The tax rate, however, should decline over the fourteen-year period. It
should start at, say, 21 % and decline 1 1h % per year so that it phases out after
fourteen years. Without a discount for the time value of money, the tax col-
lected should be about 150% of one year's earnings, which, figuring a 50%
maximum tax rate, 6 8 means that the enterprise will be capitalized at three-
times earnings.
If the business (or a part of the business) is sold before the fourteen-year
period expires, one could add the proceeds to the taxable estate with a credit
for income taxes paid to date. Presumably, income taxes will be lower if it is a
division of a corporation that is being sold. If what has happened is a redemp-
tion, the corporate income tax will not stop at that point, although there will
be a credit against the income tax based on the additional estate tax from the
redemption." 4
Placing intrafamily purchases into the structure of the tax will have some
effect on the use of multiple corporations or the gift of opportunity to children
such as Mr. Crowley gave to his children. It could be applied to a partnership
at the entity level and possibly reach my friends taking over their father's law
practice. Whether the practicalities can be worked out is a matter to be deter-
mined, as both Mr. Crowley and my friends accomplished their results during
life without the formal transfer of corporate shares or partnership interests.
The small business owner could opt to have a single tax at death, as under
current rules, but without any discounts for blockage, minority interests, lack
of a public market, or Newhouse-type confusion. The tax would be based on a
fraction of the entire corporation, valued as if owned by a single shareholder
with access to a public market. This would exempt from taxation estates that,
including a closely held business with no discounts, have a net value of less
than $600,000.
Real estate and nonbusiness assets would be taxed separately, with no mi-
nority discount. If the entire business is active real estate, the taxpayer would
presumably elect to have the above rule apply to the balance of the business
assets since the non-real estate assets would be minimal. This prevents the
income producing properties of real estate from being doubly taxed without
allowing the loophole of the taxpayer putting his residence in the business.
I do not suggest that such a change would be without difficulties. One must
watch for situations where a residence is contributed to a business or for an
overcapitalized lemonade stand whose only employee is age six, but that has a
capital of $20 million in stock of Ford Motor Company or General Motors.
163. The 50% maximum tax rate is due to come about in 1993, if the reduction in maximum
tax rate from 55% to 50% is not postponed again. I.R.C. § 2001(c). The scheduled reduction has
been postponed twice before. See Pub. L. No. 203, 101 Stat. 1330, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10401
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 2001n (1988)); Pub. L. No. 369, 98 Stat. 506, 98th Cong.,
2nd Sess. § 21(a) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 2001 (1988)).
164. One must have some restrictions on intrafamily transactions. There is too much potential
for abuse of a bargain sale in the context of an intrafamily transaction.
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Section 6166 has attempted to deal with nonbusiness assets in a business, 1 5
although there are no studies of its success. My justification could, of course,
be extended to any income producing asset, but non-closely held business as-
sets are in general easier to value and, because they are passive assets, do not
promote the same entrepreneurial spirit of the closely held business.
Not subjecting closely held businesses to transfer taxation will put gifts of
businesses and gifts of opportunity on more equal footing. If they must be
taxed, taxing future success will be more accurate than the artful guessing
that goes on under the current system.
CONCLUSION
Closely held businesses should not be subject to transfer taxation. Such tax-
ation represents an undue hardship that is not warranted by the goal of gift
and estate taxation. The goal of gift and estate taxation is to prevent undue
accumulations of wealth. Most closely held businesses do not represent the sort
of dynastic power of the Rockefellers, Carnegies, or du Ponts. The second gen-
eration will, in general, need to expend energy to preserve the closely held
business. When one realizes that service businesses, such as my friends in the
law partnership, can in general avoid transfer taxation altogether, there is sig-
nificant unfairness in attempting to tax retailers and manufacturers but not
lawyers. It is also unfair that people like Samuel Newhouse can, with expert
tax advisers, obtain results that more modest businesses would never dream of
attempting. The closely held business (manufacturer, retailer, professional
practice, or farm) is something that ought to be encouraged and not taxed out
of existence.
165. I.R.C. § 6166(b)(9) excludes passive assets from the value of the business for purposes of
determining the amount of estate tax deferrable or the eligibility of the business for the benefit of
I.R.C. § 6166.
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